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Response to Terhune: Testing Cold Control Theory
First off, we would like to thank Terhune 
for his careful (and kind) consideration of 
cold control theory. In his comment on our 
paper, Terhune queries some of the evidence 
for cold control theory and asks what specific 
predictions could be made to distinguish cold 
control from dissociated control theory. We 
agree with the thought that while cold con-
trol predicts the effects of rTMS and alcohol 
on hypnotic response that we observed, so 
does dissociated control theory — therefore 
finding the prediction true does not specifi-
cally support cold control theory (on either 
a Popperian or Bayesian perspective, Dienes, 
2008; there is no need for the specific no-
tion of ‘reverse inference’ Terhune mentions, 
above and beyond these general philosophies 
of science). However, these data do support 
both theories together against theories that 
link hypnotic response to superior execu-
tive function: Hence, these data do support 
a contrast between hypnotic response and 
meditation (as also noted by Terhune.)
So how could cold control and dis-
sociated control theory be distinguished? 
According to cold control theory, hypnotic 
response is produced by intending and car-
rying out the response using the executive 
system, while creating inaccurate higher or-
der thoughts. Thus, if the frontal system is 
mildly impaired such that it can still intend 
and carry out the response, the impairment 
will not harm hypnotic response. If the im-
pairment affects the area responsible for ac-
curate HOTs, then hypnotic response will 
be facilitated. Conversely, if the frontal lobes 
are impaired to the extent that the subject 
sometimes fails to intentionally perform the 
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action, then by cold control theory the ac-
tion will fail hypnotically just as often‡. By 
contrast, according to the dissociated con-
trol theory of Woody and Bowers (1994), 
hypnotic suggestions are not created by in-
tentions at all, therefore a failure to be able to 
intentionally produce a cognitive or motor 
action is perfectly consistent with perform-
ing the action hypnotically. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely because the intentional (or executive) 
system has been compromised that hypnotic 
response occurs at all, according to (this ver-
sion) of dissociated control theory. Dienes 
and Perner (2007) argued that many hyp-
notic responses appeared to involve execu-
tive functions, specifically overcoming habit 
and pre-potent responses (e.g. producing 
habitual responses at below baseline levels, 
Spanos, Radtke, &  Dubreuil, 1982; overcom-
ing the Stroop effect, Raz et al, 2006) . On 
the face of it, such responses are problematic 
for dissociated control theory and consis-
tent with cold control. Dissociated control 
theory could remedy the problem by pos-
tulating that the executive system was not 
actually involved at all in such responses; in-
stead, for example, low level perception was 
changed (in a special hypnotic way, still to 
be specified), perceptions that triggered only 
automatic responses. (If subjects do not see a 
word after being given an alexia suggestion, 
they do not need to inhibit the word.)  For 
example, if people became sufficiently drunk 
that they could not inhibit a pre-potent re-
sponse intentionally, then by cold control 
theory, the response could not be inhibited 
hypnotically; by dissociated control theory, 
hypnotic response could still be successful.
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‡ These opposing predic-
tions hold under specifiable 
circumstances — so the 
falsifiability of the theory is 
not compromised
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With Ben Parris, we are currently collect-
ing data on the key prediction of cold control 
theory that the intentional performance of 
an action can achieve anything that the hyp-
notic performance can*. Specifically, in a “vo-
litional” condition, we tell subjects that that 
they can imagine words have no meaning, 
and experience their imagination as com-
pletely under their volitional control, and 
experience it as imagination and not per-
ception. So far we have found that subjects 
achieve the requisite phenomenology — and 
also expect that they will experience the 
words as meaningless just as strongly in the 
volitional as in the normal post-hypnotic 
alexia condition. If the Stroop effect is re-
duced less in the volitional than the post-
hypnotic suggestion condition, cold control 
theory is in trouble. Theories that postulate 
that hypnosis can change perception in a pe-
culiar way would in contrast be supported. 
There would be more to hypnotic responding 
than self deception — more than cold control 
theory postulates.
One correction is needed. Terhune claims 
that it is striking that in Semmens-Wheeler 
and Dienes (submitted), alcohol intoxication 
impaired performance on executive func-
tioning tasks but did not influence behavior-
al hypnotic responding. However, the only 
measure of response in that study was the 
subject’s rating of how strongly they experi-
enced the suggestion, which alcohol strongly 
affected. Further, such subjective ratings are 
generally highly correlated with “objective” 
measurements (such as whether the arm 
moved more than a certain amount for an 
arm heaviness suggestion) (e.g. McConkey, 
Wende and Barnier, 1999). As yet there is 
no direct evidence either way as to whether 
disrupting frontal function fails to influence 
objective measures of responding. We antici-
pate that sensitive measurements will show 
disrupting frontal function will affect objec-
tive measures, as subjective experiences and 
behavioral responses tend to go together in 
cooperative subjects.
Terhune asks the interesting question 
of how the formation of inaccurate HOTs 
about intentions actually improves the like-
lihood of those intentions giving rise to a 
particular hypnotic response. Why would 
the person have relevant intentions to lift 
an arm or imagine a counterfactual world 
in the first place? Consistent with White’s 
(1942) seminal notion of hypnosis as “goal 
directed striving”, a person will attempt to 
respond hypnotically when it fits their goals. 
To respond to arm levitation, a person may 
intend to lift the arm a small amount to see 
if it feels light. But they may only continue 
to lift their arm to a levitation suggestion if 
it feels like it is happening by itself, so the 
subjective experience likely feeds the moti-
vation for the behavioral response and vice 
versa. (That is why the subjective and objec-
tive measurements of hypnotic response are 
so correlated.) McConkey et al (1999) asked 
subjects to continuously turn a dial indicat-
ing the strength of their hypnotic experience 
as they responded to suggestions. In general 
they found the dial was turned progres-
sively higher as the suggestion progressed. 
One could imagine subjects first tentatively 
trying the suggestion voluntarily, then suc-
cessful subjects finding they can experience 
some involuntariness (as they generate inac-
curate higher order thoughts), motivating 
the first order intention even more.  With 
practice, a high may be able to launch into 
a fully involuntary response from the begin-
ning. However, much of this is speculation; 
the dial method should be useful in explor-
ing cold control processes in more detail in 
future research.
 
* This is a separate question 
to whether an induc-
tion alters performance. 
Assuming subjects do 
not need an induction to 
respond hypnotically — in 
the sense of experiencing 
alterations in perception in 
volition to suit task demands 
(as we define hypnosis in the 
main article), then finding 
an induction not relevant to 
e.g. responding to the alexia 
suggestion (Raz et al 2006)  
still leaves open the question 
of whether the intentional 
performance of an action 
can achieve anything that 
the hypnotic performance 
can.
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